

CAROLINA



PATRIOT.

PUBLISHED WEEKLY BY CLANCY & EVANS. . . . PRO DEO, ET PRO PATRIA. . . . AT \$2,50 PER ANNUM, PAID IN ADVANCE.

NEW SERIES.

GREENSBOROUGH, N. C., FRIDAY MORNING, SEPTEMBER 7, 1838.

VOL. II—NO. 21.

*From the *Advertiser* for August.*

DICK JAWL'S BARGAIN.

Dick Day was a man who loved repose; his good wife Rocked him by the nose, That is, neither words nor woe would move him to say that Rock had wanted spirit, But Dick was a man where's the merit!

Who means with peaking am or chiding speech?

Dick had a dog, and Jowler was his name, A cause of mirth he seemed to the dame, For Jowler was as busy as his master; And in the kitchen, as nothing he would creep like on the hearth or in the corner-sleep.

With many a span, plotting some disaster,

A joint of meat unwhetted, held shyly up it, Or soup or gravy in a dish he'd spit;

And then would between his legs, creepout, Or else the dog was always in the way.

The hands left over his carcass every day,

And then the kitchen was in such a riot!

"I do declare!" then cried the honest wife, "This vile old brute will worry out my life;

I wish the dog was dead or else in Gauger; Get out!" and near sh'd jump him with a stick.

"Were I a man," and here she'd look at Dick, "But what's the use to talk to such a many Time after time, when e're these ill-fated hounds,

Dick straight would swear "confound the dog I'll sell him!"

And then I hope to have some little quiet."

Dick smoked his pipe, and still the threat grew cold;

He soon forgot that Jowler must be sold,

Until his wife would raise another riot.

At length one day their houseward came with a gun,

"My dear, I've sold the dog!" "How much?"

"Ten pounds!" "Ten pounds?" "Where is it away?"

"I got no cash, the laying husband said,

But took two current, five pounds a head;

Which comes you know, my dear, to just the money!"

A LETTER
FROM THE HON. HUGH S. LEGARE,
(of South Carolina)
On the probable effects of the Sub-Treasury
policy with the specie clause.

To His Excellency Ira Newell, Governor
of South Carolina.

WASHINGTON, JUNE 26, 1838.

DEAR SIR: The House has just refused by an almost unanimous vote, to reconsider its decision upon the sub-Treasury bill, as reported by the Committee of Ways and Means. That decision you will have heard was unexpectedly made yesterday afternoon, the Committee of the Whole having struck out the enacting clause, and made a report accordingly, and the House ordered the bill passed, so suddenly that many who were desirous of expressing their sentiments on the great question were deprived of an opportunity of doing so in debate. I was one of them. Situated as I was, in consequence of the repeated demurral of the Legislature, of what the actual President is doing, or what the late President has done, I speak of a system becoming more and more established every day, part of what all future Presidents will do, as a matter of course, because systems are too strong for men, and overrule the best intentions. I speak of what is the inevitable consequence of the "discipline of party," as it is so expressively called here, by which the freedom of private judgment is sacrificed to the *inorganic* will of the majority, and public opinion is shaped, with a view to future elections, by a few leaders dictating, no one knows how, to multitudes of dissenting, dissatisfied, yet complying followers—the whole body doing what almost every member of it disapproves. This is the mystery of great masses, the *aristocratic* spirit of a vast body politic, which every day of our longer experience will tend more and more to reveal, if things go on as they now do.

I do not of course mean to deny that the opinions of its constituents are entitled to great weight with the representative. Unquestionably they are, and where they differ from his they ought "to give him pause," and awaken in him a deep sense of the responsibility he incurs in declining to comply with them. But the truth is, there is not the least reason for apprehending that they will not generally have their full effect. On the contrary, the danger is all the other way. It is, unfortunately, but too rare a thing every where, to see a public man resist the passion or prejudice of the day, at the risk of his own popularity and success, tho' he be sure it will pass away with the day. Even if ambition did not tempt, or lesser motives dispose him to yield that which has been well described as "the great master-vise of men of business, a degenerate and inglorious sloth," mere indolence, the dread of strife and censure, would be enough to make the duty of resistance an irksome and even odious one. With such a pretext to cover the cowardice of doing wrong, the people have nothing to do but to draw from the meanness or indolence of their representatives. Their will, however pernicious and capricious, will be crossed by very few; they will always have courage enough to pursue that they can do no wrong, for power never wants them, and of all sovereigns the "people-king" is surrounded with the most dangerous, because the best disguised parasites and scroopants. But the true friend, the faithful counsellor, the servant who will dare to disloyally command his master will soon repent of having given the representative who will not sacrifice the deliberate sense of his constituents in the exercise of a high and ethereal reason, in the laws and constitution, in the false imposition of electing by a majority of unlearns; the statesmen who looks to future consequences, and reasons to the Senate, (Mr. Weston,) to whom, of course, this general declaration of opinion may be deemed to be particularly addressed. Suppose all argument ent off, as it might as well be under such a system, by the previous question, and every representative voting perpetually under instructions, and you have the ideal perfection of a deliberative assembly constructed according to the maxims; a truly wise it would be, to call a Rump Parliament, or to compare with the Senate of Tiberius and Caligula.

Considered as a principle of a regular Government, the doctrine of which I am speaking will not bear a moment's examination. The right to *overruling* instruction implies the right to disallow any act done in violation of it, and to revoke immediately the powers of the agents of all organizations—but no body, so far as I am yet informed, is extrajudicately empowered that any

such right exists under our Government.—The Senator or Representative who acts upon his own convictions, and not those of his own constituents, forfeits none of his authority, is not a jot the less a law-giver, including the whole country by his acts, to the utmost extent of the jurisdiction of the Government. It is a wild conceit to imagine, as I have seen it asserted somewhere, that the State Legislature has a right to control the *coastal*, tho' it has nothing to do with the *conveniences* of its representatives here. This is a *deceit* in the true spirit of the other which is intended to advance, but much more inconsistent with all ideas of good government and social order. It would be nothing short of a fundamental revolution in our institutions. It would be making us a mere league of foreign nations, and turning this Congress of law-givers into a Congress of ambassadors. In short, no doctrine (supposing it abused, as it will always be) is more utterly licentious and subversive in all its bearings and tendencies, and, what may not at first strike you, there never was one, at the same time, better calculated, in the long run, to lay the power of this body, the Legislature of the country, and all the precious principles of our Government of laws at the foot of the Executive and a despised corps of managers under its influence. I shall not stop to develop this important branch of the subject, on which I have had occasion to meditate much; but I give it to you as my deliberate conviction, that the balance of the Constitution is subverted; that, there, in the extraneous influences so constantly brought to bear upon it, the Federal Legislature is shorn of almost all dignity and authority; that the freedom of thought and action essential to the very idea of a representative assembly, charged with the conduct of a *limited* Government, is assailed on all sides, and has been seriously impaired; and that our republic is beginning to take the shape of an elective monarchy, *tempered* in some degree by two Houses of Parliament, whose occasional opposition to the will of the Executive is treated as revolt against the people, in the person of their only true representatives. I do not speak of this, or that Administration; or of what the actual President is doing, or what the late President has done. I speak of a system becoming more and more established every day, part of what all future Presidents will do, as a matter of course, because systems are too strong for men, and overrule the best intentions. I speak of what is the inevitable consequence of the "discipline of party," as it is so expressively called here, by which the freedom of private judgment is sacrificed to the *inorganic* will of the majority, and public opinion is shaped, with a view to future elections, by a few leaders dictating, no one knows how, to multitudes of dissenting, dissatisfied, yet complying followers—the whole body doing what almost every member of it disapproves. This is the mystery of great masses, the *aristocratic* spirit of a vast body politic, which every day of our longer experience will tend more and more to reveal, if things go on as they now do.

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likely to be on the currency and the markets of England.

It is evident, from the bare stating of these facts, that every draught which we make upon the common stock of the precious metals narrows, in a greater or less degree, the basis of the convertible currency of England, and reduces, in a corresponding degree, the prices of the commodities carried to her markets for sale.—Every exportation of specie from that country to this, with a view to equalize exchanges, has the same effect. Now, I ask, how we of the planting States, whose whole capital is laid out in producing those very commodities, can be supposed to have a special interest, or, indeed, any interest at all, in a policy of which, *ceteris paribus*, this is the inevitable result! I do not now speak of the amount of the mischief that may be done us. The additional quantity of specie necessary to carry on the new system may be, as some allege, only \$8,000,000 or 10,000,000 dollars, and that taken from the whole stock now existing in the world. Be it so, for the present; still, this will create a demand for \$8,000,000 or 10,000,000 over and above what has been hitherto required for our circulation, and *up to that amount* it will operate proportionally upon the basis of English currency—which, as we have seen, feels every thing of the kind that happens in any part of the commercial world with extreme sensitiveness—and consequently diminishes what the prices of our staple commodities, it is superfluous to add that counteracting causes, e. g., an extraordinary demand for cotton twist and yarns abroad, &c., might cause prices more than thus curtailed would depress them, and so disguise the effect of the latter from superficial observers. Still it would not be the less real for not being perceived. Suppose the fall of price no more than a halfpenny a pound—the loss to the South on something like \$90,000,000 or 600,000,000 pounds of cotton would, as you perceive, be only \$500,000 or \$6,000,000. And should your public deposits swell up to what the balances in the Treasury were on the first day of the years 1836 and 1837—or to \$26,749,803 to the former, and \$15,938,523 in the latter—the tax we should be compelled to pay in the way of fall of prices might not be very short of what it was last year, viz: something \$29,000,000 or \$9,000,000, to say nothing of all the other embarrassments of the country which would spring out of such a terrible derangement of the currency. Rather a costly improvement this!

There is another point of view in which this inseparable connexion between the currency and commerce of England with the prices of our southern products deserves to be considered here. It evidently renders us, so far as those prices are concerned, independent of all fluctuations of the convertible currency. It may be true, as some allege, that, because of the fluctuations to which it is thus liable, such a currency is inconsistent with the regularity required in the operations of trade. It may be true, too, that the functions of the bank, as an issuer of currency, ought to be separated (as Mr. S. Jones Loyd and others have urged) from those of the office of discount, or the lending of money at interest. Be it so. I say nothing on these points here, I am concerned only with the fact—a fact which we can neither change, nor neglect with impunity; and its consequences on prices and trade. England is, as Mr. Rothschild well said, "the bank of the whole world," and most especially of our world. Her moneyed operations concern us to the full as much as they do her own people, and *ex concessa* it is obviously necessary, in the discussion of every new financial project here, to consider what its effects are

I cite from the Minutes of Evidence, &c., 1832, some details upon this subject.

It is said that about all the circulation of Lancashire, Warwickshire, the West Riding of Yorkshire, &c., except small sums paid away in wages, was in bills, post notes, &c.

The amount of bills paid into a certain bank in Lancaster was 30 to 40 of all other currency.

Mr. 5324. Therefore contraction of the Bank of England forms a very uncertain measure of the whole circulation. Certainly, for bills of exchange being the circulating medium, agreeable and suitable diminution of their amount operates materially on prices, and produces all the distresses usually attendant on sudden contractions of the currency.

Yes, and to a much greater extent than is measured by the mere issues of the Bank of England. So that, sometimes, the bank contracting in self-defence, a late produce suffers for this intention.

How strongly has this been verified by late events?

In this country is the bank of the whole world. I mean that all transactions in India, China, Germany, in Russia, and in the whole world are guided, live, and settled through this country.

A. T. Smith, of Akron.

Can you believe all they say?

Q. Certainly.

Q. When they contradict themselves how do you think them?

A. We take their last assertions, to be the true democratic. We follow in the Revised Statutes, (and remember Mr. Butler was one of the Revisors,) "the last clause or section shall prevail."

Q. Good day sir, I may ask you, perhaps another time a few more questions?

A. I shall answer them with great pleasure.

Take the Crucified Lamb, Give Repaid

and etc.

DISCOVERY OF THE SKELETON OF A MASTODON.

Bucyrus, Aug. 11.—Mr. Abraham

Hicks, while engaged with his work hands

in excavating a Mill-race, about

quarters of a mile east of Bucyrus, (Craw-

ford County, Ohio,) discovered

the skeleton of a Mastodon, the bones

of which were scattered over the surface

of the ground, discovered the follow-

ing day, and he called

the attention of the

people to the find.

The history of the bones is

involved in mystery. No tradition or his-

tory and knowledge of bones of its exis-

tence at any period, until that it was dis-

covered with the present of the past,

Chambers still has the bones.

Never seen to determine the origin;

And caused him to sell his home,

And took off his coat to the Mastodon,

And caused him to leave his home,

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